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BUSINESS MODEL RESPONSES TO DIGITAL PIRACY 
 
SUMMARY 
Digital piracy challenges firms by reducing revenues and shifting consumption habits. 
Recently, some firms have successfully leveraged business models against piracy, but the 
understanding about this phenomenon still lacks depth and structure. This study examines the 
characteristics of digital piracy in some of the most affected industries, presents comparative case 
studies of two iconic firms, Spotify and Netflix, and analyzes their digital business model 
responses. We generalize their adoption to generic digital content distributors and explain how 
they contribute to generate and capture value. Theoretical and practical implications for 
technological innovation, firm diversification, and network competition are also discussed.  
 
Keywords: Digital Distribution; Piracy; Business Model; Innovation; Netflix; Spotify. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
It has been almost twenty years since, on June 1st, 1999, Napster hit the Internet and 
pioneered the global phenomenon of peer-to-peer file sharing, thus initiating a new era for digital 
piracy.1 This was made possible by the digitalization of content paired with Internet connectivity 
for the masses, which enabled large-scale and easy access to copies (music in the case of 
Napster). Digital piracy has thrived in satisfying the public’s demand for fast, convenient, and 
easy-to-access content: the primary feed for the so-called ‘on-demand generation.’2 Today, the 
effects of online piracy are ‘both alarming and profound’3 and its resilience is well proven in the 
face of fierce technical and legal attacks, as well as continuous educational campaigns.  
Despite coordinated industry efforts through organizations such as the Recording Industry 
Association of America, the Intellectual Property Owners Association, or the more recent 
Alliance for Creativity and Entertainment, as well as policy interventions from governments, 
piracy has drastically overhauled various industries. Digital piracy enables consumers to 
substitute purchases from licensed distribution channels with copies from unlicensed Internet 
sources, and thus reduces the revenues of artists and producers unable or unwilling to engage 
with new solutions to compete against piracy.4 The International Chamber of Commerce in 2017 
estimated that the global value of digital piracy in movies, music, and software was $213 billion 
in 2015, and it is expected to raise between $384 and $856 billion by 2020.5 While these rough 
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industry figures overestimate revenues losses (given that not every copy is a lost sale, as 
consumers engaged in piracy may not be willing purchase the content or in some cases may 
purchase it anyway) the impact has led industry incumbents to rethink their distribution strategies 
if not their entire business models.6 
The digital piracy phenomenon is not only timely and compelling for business, but also 
relevant for academic purposes as it pushes organizations to embrace radical responses aimed at 
adapting their value creation and value capture activities. Prior research has examined individual 
incentives for consumers to engage in piracy, as well as organizational responses via pricing 
mechanisms, educational campaigns, and technical or legal actions.  Yet, these countermeasures 
have proven unable to repress piracy practices; they are part of the solution, but as a matter of fact 
digital piracy is still widespread and will most likely continue to grow. We deem practitioners 
and scholars would benefit from a systematic understanding that, by being theoretically anchored, 
could offer an account of business model responses that is applicable across several sectors 
affected by piracy. 
We have analyzed several of the domains where digital piracy operates and have studied the 
success and failure of companies competing against piracy: a broad and complex challenge which 
is affecting several industries.7 Digital piracy offers consumers a convenient and cost-effective 
method to access desired content, often serving demand that is not fully addressed by traditional 
distribution. From a business model perspective, digital piracy thus offers a value proposition 
(free access to a large content library, in the best scenario) that is nonetheless associated with 
specific downsides such as lower quality copies, copies with incomplete functionality, or lack of 
complementary resources such as content discovery tools or community interactions. In this 
article we present an analysis of the digital piracy phenomenon to identify these factors and the 
strategic responses available to the firm. Scholars and practitioners have suggested that a possible 
response for firms lies in changing the companies’ business models, the mechanisms of value 
creation and value capture to engage with the consumer.8 More so, evidence seems to suggest that 
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the innovation necessary for such objective can possibly be achieved thanks to the very same 
digital technologies that help piracy flourish. However, to date research provides scarce and 
unstructured empirical evidence with regards to the potential of business model responses to 
counter digital piracy. 
Our work addresses the following research question: How can firms design their business 
model to minimize the negative impact of digital piracy? In our endeavor, technological 
innovation remains a key aspect to understand the interplay between digital piracy and business 
model responses. Scholars affirm that “an important research agenda for technology strategy 
scholars is to unpick the interdependencies between business model choice, technology 
development, and success.”9 Our aim is precisely to contribute to this agenda by carefully 
accounting for the properties of digital piracy that have not been recognized or integrated in prior 
research and unveil how business models, enabled by digital technologies can provide the most 
effective response to the challenge. The iconic cases of Netflix and Spotify are analyzed and used 
to derive generalizable consideration for other industries affected by digital piracy. 
THE CHALLENGES OF DIGITAL PIRACY 
Digital piracy is enabled by advances in computing technology. This encompasses both 
software and hardware, with improvements in media encoding as well as widespread adoption of 
computing devices and Internet connectivity by the consumer population at large. Digital piracy 
takes place when consumers engage in unlicensed distribution of content in digital file formats, 
for example by sharing copyrighted music files which are commercially available in the 
marketplace. This is fundamentally different from other forms of piracy such as counterfeit of 
fake products, which is based on the production of physical replicas of original goods for 
commercial profit. We focus on digital piracy taking place online, that is, where the content is 
distributed over the Internet. This has superseded offline exchanges based on physical supports 
such as floppy disks or optical discs. 
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Digital piracy has evolved over several generations of Internet applications. These include 
newsgroups such as Usenet, centralized server-based exchanges on private or public hosting sites, 
and peer-to-peer file sharing (p2p). The latter became mainstream with the development of 
Napster, a music file sharing application that was shut down under legal challenge from the music 
industry.10 But file sharing technology has evolved quickly. Subsequent applications such as 
BitTorrent can operate over decentralized network architectures with no single point of shutdown 
and facilitate the exchange of any type of content (including content in the public domain or 
authorized for public distribution) with greatly improved efficiency. The technology has matured 
to the point where it is a major driver of digital piracy and is relatively accessible to the average 
Internet user.11  
Digital piracy has proven exceptionally resilient to both technical and legal attacks. 
Copyright holders have infiltrated file sharing networks with ‘spoof’ content to discourage users 
from downloading unauthorized material, but with limited success.12 Technical attempts by 
Internet service providers to curb file sharing traffic have triggered an arms race between network 
engineers and p2p application designers. Users are also rerouting their Internet traffic to bypass 
monitoring, with facilitating services such as virtual private networks (i.e., VPN) or remote file 
sharing clients (i.e., Seedboxes) flourishing in some countries. 
Legal attacks have also failed to curb illegal file sharing.13 Major legal cases against 
proprietary p2p applications Napster in 2001 and Grokster in 2005 led to the successful 
development of open source p2p software initiatives. Copyright holders have sent warning letters 
and prosecuted file sharing users in several countries, with the media often describing large 
damage claims; yet, these initiatives have failed to significantly reduce online sharing traffic.14 
Some countries have enacted laws to penalize users engaging in digital piracy, with users mostly 
risking fines and temporal Internet disconnection. These initiatives have seen short-term falls in 
domestic file sharing traffic, but public resistance, technical workarounds by users, and legal 
procedures requiring judicial oversight on a case by case basis are perceived as blocks to their 
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effective application. For example, scholars have reported that graduated response programs 
(which penalize repeat file-sharing offenders) are not effective in raising box office revenues of 
new films.15 
Several studies have analyzed the factors that draw consumers to digital piracy.16 A key 
factor is the perception that piracy is free, or more precisely, that no monetary outlays are 
required to access the content. Consumers also highlight other factors that make piracy attractive, 
such as access to a large catalog of titles and the ability to bypass release windows and 
geographical restrictions in commercial distribution. Because Digital Rights Management (DRM) 
restrictions are removed from pirated content, consumers can also use the content on their own 
terms and on any compatible device. Nonetheless, consumers recognize the downsides of digital 
piracy. It requires some skills and dedication, some technical equipment (e.g., a computer that 
remains powered during downloading, Internet bandwidth, digital storage), it is often slow, and 
the quality of the content downloaded is inconsistent. Finally, its controversial or illegal nature 
might expose users to psychological stress, moral costs and legal penalties. 
The academic literature has also analyzed the impact of digital piracy on industry revenues. 
A large number of studies have focused on the impact of file sharing on the music industry, given 
that the Napster phenomenon provided a unique time window to examine the effect of file sharing 
on traditional commercial distribution arrangements.17 This literature strives to estimate sales 
displacement, that is, the volume of sales that is lost due to the presence of file sharing. A typical 
estimate is a ‘rate of sales displacement’ of circa 20%, though the estimated effect can vary 
significantly across studies. It is worth stressing that sales displacement is not a one-to-one 
relationship to the number of pirate copies downloaded, given that not all digital piracy users 
would be willing to purchase the content. Given the hurdles involved in precisely tracking piracy 
and its effects on commercial sales,18 we echo other scholars’ in suggesting that the estimates 
from any single study be taken with ‘a grain of salt.’19 Researchers and monitoring agencies often 
warn about the accuracy of data on piracy activity and suggest to focus on general trends rather 
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than precise assessments. Unavoidable estimation challenges and constraints have led to adopting 
alternative mathematical models and simulations of file sharing dynamics to analyze the optimal 
pricing strategy for commercial distribution.  
Research has also analyzed the implications of digital piracy for content pricing and in the 
context of supply-side restrictions, where consumers in some regions lack access to specific 
content through domestic distribution channels (for instance due to release windows, content 
licensing or quota restrictions, or geographical coverage of online stores). 20 This strand of work 
finds that eradicating piracy through aggressive pricing may not be optimal and that the key to 
competing effectively is to match the aspects of the service valued by consumers and improve 
upon them.21  
“Content providers must shift their response to piracy from being device-oriented, such 
as traditional conditional access systems and digital rights management to 
comprehensive service-oriented approaches and modern tools against piracy.” (Sam 
Rosen, President at ABI Research – Cue Entertainment, 2017)22 
In other words, to better understand the extent to which firms can respond to digital piracy, 
one should not focus only on pricing but adopt a more comprehensive and holistic view, ideally 
encompassing the entire business model responses that organizations can deploy. 
FIRM RESPONSES VIA BUSINESS MODELS 
While the academic debate has developed a plethora of definitions of business model,23 one 
of the most common by Teece terms it as “the design of a value creation, value delivery and value 
capture mechanisms employed by companies as mean to entice customers to pay for value and 
convert those payments into profits.”24 The business model concept can be usefully applied to 
any organization with some business purpose—including those engaging with digital piracy. 
As means to more precisely distinguish and classify business models, Baden-Fuller and 
Haefliger advanced a conceptualization of four constitutive elements, namely: i. Customer 
identification; ii. Customer engagement; iii. Monetization; and iv. Value chain linkages.25 
Customer identification defines the firm’s targeted user and customer groups. It specifies if the 
business model is dyadic (i.e., between the firm and a single type of customer) or multi-sided, 
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(i.e., it connects multiple groups and monetize from their interaction). The customer engagement 
explains the value proposition for each of the user or customer groups. The authors emphasize the 
difference between ‘project-based systems’ which create value by interacting with customers 
(e.g., consulting firms), and ‘pre-designed (scale) based systems’ (e.g., standardized products)—
often described as the ‘taxi’ and ‘bus’ systems, respectively. The third element, monetization, is a 
key part of value capture and involves more than just pricing, as it includes systems determining 
timing of payment and methods for collecting revenues (i.e., free, freemium, subscription, work-
for-hire, etc.). Finally, the value chain linkages are the mechanisms the firm uses to deliver its 
product or service to the customer, and it defines returns from adoption, for examples via network 
effects.  
Firms often change their business models to adapt to new contingencies, including piracy, 
and establish a competitive advantage.26 Changing a business model consists of adding or 
terminating activities, linking them in novel ways, or redefining the way in which the customer 
engagement takes place (e.g., from brick-and-mortar to online). Changing business models is 
often paired with innovation.27 Yet, Teece argues that innovation does not only pertain to 
advancing new products but also to pursuing new ways of engaging with the customer—that is, 
“innovating” the business model. When sufficiently innovative and hard to imitate, business 
models can become key factors for superior returns and sustainable competitive advantage.28 
Technological innovation prompts opportunities for piracy empowerment, as well as for new 
business models design.29 Evidence shows how some firms (i.e., Amazon, Apple, AirBnB, 
Facebook) have flourished through business model innovation that was in turn enabled by new 
digital technologies, while others (i.e., Nokia, Kodak, Atari) missed such opportunities and 
experienced severe performance drops. 
Within the same industry, firms compete using different business models. For example, 
within the music and movie industries some firms focus on production (e.g., the movie and music 
majors) while others focus on distribution and customer engagement (e.g., online streaming 
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platforms, rental companies, music event planners). Recent studies have questioned traditional 
business models in these industries in light of technological change.30 Our analysis focuses 
precisely on this last stage of the supply chain: the distribution and monetization of content. 
Spotify and Netflix, our two case studies, distribute content which is mostly produced and owned 
by others, namely the record labels and the movie studios. Our approach is based on the 
observation that the incentives of content distributors and those of content owners must be 
aligned with respect to the maximization of profits generated in distribution. Clearly, if content 
owners rely on outside distributors it must be the case that these firms excel in this area, as 
content owners would otherwise have every incentive to distribute the content themselves (and 
their past failures when launching digital distribution initiatives signal their difficulties to do so). 
Thus, our unit of analysis is superior performance in distribution and not the production or 
ownership of the content.31 Some recent research already suggested that there seems to be a 
positive relationship between business model change and recovering revenues in the music 
industry.32 Our goal is to further advance our understanding on these critical competitive 
dynamics vis-à-vis digital piracy. 
METHOD 
This study presents a qualitative analysis of the responses to digital piracy emerging from 
two case studies,33 Netflix and Spotify. Several media recently reported how these two 
companies’ business models have managed to invert the rise of digital piracy, and (for the first 
time) managed to even reduce illegal downloads. 
“Internet streaming services such as Spotify and Netflix have resulted in online piracy 
falling to its lowest rate in years, an official report claims.” (James Titcomb - The 
Telegraph, 2016). 
“A hacker who has unsuccessfully tried to hold Netflix for ransom has achieved an 
unexpected result: His failure shows that subscription-based business models in content 
distribution is making piracy pointless. Intellectual property owners’ slowness in 
adopting these models is the only reason content is still being pirated.” (Leonid 
Bershidsky - Bloomberg, 2017).34 
Yin explains that a case study is “an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon within its real-life context where the boundaries between the phenomenon and the 
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context are not clearly evident and in which multiple sources of evidence are used.”35 As such, 
the multiple case study design is the most relevant for our endeavor, as it allows for a detailed 
exploration of the different strategies implemented by firms as mean to overcome digital piracy’s 
threats.  
Our study builds on publicly available archival sources and databases, and the great majority 
of the findings we present are based on a theoretically-driven elaboration of such data. Yet some 
primary sources were also collected, mostly with the intent of obtaining external, objective 
opinions on the main issues, trends, and an additional validation of our interpretation.   
First, we obtained archival data from a broad range of sources, and this allowed us to gain a 
nuanced understanding of the industries analyzed, and more specifically of the firms’ different 
business models. Great attention was devoted to the issue of piracy, particularly in digital form. 
Documents include yearly reports from industry organizations  such as the Recording Industry 
Association of America, the Intellectual Property Owners Association, and the Alliance for 
Creativity and Entertainment, but also media articles and data from sources such as Bloomberg, 
Financial Times, The Economist, The Wall Street Journal, and Reuters (among others), technical 
websites, piracy community discussions, experts’ blogs, official investor relations and financial 
reports from Spotify and Netflix.36 The final selection included 96 documents (235 pages) that 
directly addressed the topic with a sufficient level of specificity and reliability, while minimizing 
duplication of information. Industry data mostly informed us on digital piracy features and the 
business models of Netflix and Spotify. Academic papers mostly suggested information on 
general company responses and piracy value propositions, some of which included Netflix and 
Spotify.  
Second, we gathered primary data from face-to-face semi-structured interviews. Nine 
extensive interviews were conducted for a total of 495 minutes of engagement (some 
interviewees asked to remain anonymous given the confidentiality of the topics). All interviewees 
are considered major experts in the movie and music business and have held executive positions 
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in the field for over 5 years. Seven interviewees work for incumbents (Warner Bros., Universal 
Pictures, Disney, Légende Films) whose business models are currently facing significant 
struggles against digital piracy. They were thus very useful in providing expert insights on the 
piracy challenges and the incumbents’ efforts to respond to this threat, as well as an external 
perspective on digital industry newcomers. The remaining two interviewees were executives at 
Spotify and Netflix in charge of customer engagement and business modelling; beside their own 
views on the industry and digital piracy, they provided additional validation of the archival 
coding and the decisions that their companies implemented.37 Interviews were taped and 
transcribed. All interviews were based on similar items that were designed to produce answers to 
the following question: ‘What business models do firms use to minimize digital piracy?’  
We analyzed and compared our data with a cross-case research protocol,38 seeking to 
identify similar constructs and topics in the data. As a result, we divided our findings into a 
comparative table that examined: (1) The most salient features of digital piracy across different 
content categories; (2) The most salient features of Netflix and Spotify’s business models; (3) 
How the focal companies’ business models respond to specific piracy value propositions; (4) The 
limitations and challenges such business models entail. Our analyses were framed by using the 
conceptualization of the business model’s four constitutive elements proposed by Baden-Fuller 
and Haefliger.39 We then condensed our findings using a ‘causal loop diagram’ following the 
methodology proposed by Casadesus-Masanell and Ricart. 40 This provides a systematic and 
parsimonious representation of the key elements identified in Netflix and Spotify’s business 
models, which can be useful to both scholars and practitioners. 
FRAMING DIGITAL PIRACY WITHIN CONTENT CATEGORIES 
The evolution of digital piracy over the last two decades has varied across different content 
categories. Digital piracy exerted pressure on the music and movie industries earlier and with 
higher intensity than on the book publishing industry, for instance. We examine the drivers of 
these differences across the main categories of content, including audio (such as music albums), 
film (movies or TV shows), written works (books or comics), and interactive works (videogames 
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or software applications). This can explain how the threat to commercial distribution varies 
across categories, and we will build on these drivers to analyze the business model responses. 
It is noteworthy that Daniel Ek, founder and CEO of Spotify, formerly owned uTorrent, one 
of the most popular software applications used to download content by users engaging in digital 
piracy.41 He openly affirmed that the Spotify model was created as a response to piracy, a 
phenomenon he knew very well. This suggests that a profound understanding of the digital piracy 
phenomenon is a valuable basis to understand how to develop effective countermeasures. 
Table 1 summarizes our findings. For each category, we focus on (1) The costs of producing 
the first unlicensed digital copy of a given piece of content, which is a prerequisite for large scale 
sharing; (2) The costs for consumers to locate and copy desired pieces of content; and (3) The 
costs and convenience to consume those digital copies. Taken together, these factors determine 
the size of the content catalog available through digital piracy to the average consumer in each 
category and its attractiveness to satisfy consumption. 
 [Insert Table 1 about here] 
In summary, the table suggests that digital piracy should be more attractive for audio content 
than for film, and more attractive for both of these categories than for written and interactive 
works.42 This is because copies of audio and video content are easier to create, share, and 
consume on different devices. For these reasons, content catalogues of pirated music and video 
are comparatively larger, easier to access, and often of higher quality.  
It is therefore not surprising that the most innovative and effective business model responses 
have emerged in the music and movie industries, from players such as Spotify and Netflix, where 
the threat of digital piracy is stronger. Similar solutions have indeed also emerged for other 
categories, such as Amazon Kindle Unlimited for books or Sony’s PlayStation Now for 
videogames (both of which are subscription-based services offering immediate access to content), 
but they are not major players in their respective categories and fall short of the offerings 
provided by Spotify or Netflix on several dimensions.43  
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SPOTIFY AND NETFLIX BUSINESS MODEL RESPONSES TO DIGITAL PIRACY 
Spotify and Netflix are two of the most prominent and advanced digital distribution 
services emerged in the last decade, and those that have been more consistently associated 
with the anti-piracy trend. Their rise corresponded to a major cultural shift in consumers’ 
behavior, who accepted the idea that they could buy music and movies without actually 
owning any physical support but only a license to reproduce the content. 
“Sometime in the period between 2008 and 2012, consumers, or at least a significant 
number of them, started to accept the notion being promulgated by companies 
like Netflix and Spotify that they didn’t really need to own music or movies; they were 
happy to lease them for a monthly subscription fee in exchange for unlimited access to a 
close-to-unlimited library.” (Alan Wolk – The Guardian, 2015).44 
Both of these services offer real-time streaming of content, subscription plans, and attractive 
pricing. They are recognized as innovative players and are at the forefront of industry responses 
to digital piracy, as evidenced by their widespread appeal and large userbase. Spotify started to 
stream music over the Internet to consumers in 2008, and Netflix debuted its video streaming 
service in 2007. Both secured support in their respective category from content owners, record 
labels and film studios, and were launched on the back of earlier commercial initiatives that failed 
to catch on with consumers (in many cases launched by the content owners themselves). They are 
ultimately “a ‘prototypical exemplar’ of a category” and are often used in the media and in 
common language as a refence point to describe other businesses—see for example media 
statements like “Trader (…) the Netflix of Apparel” (CNBC); “Fiit, The Netflix Of Fitness” 
(Forbes), “SoundtrackYourBrand (…) the Spotify of Business” (Forbes) and “CKBK is the 
Spotify of cookbooks” (Quartzy). Accordingly to recent literature on business models emergence, 
they can thus be defined as “iconic business models.”45  
Table 2 provides a granular comparison of the characteristics of Spotify and Netflix’s 
services according to the four constitutive elements proposed by Baden-Fuller and Haefliger. 46  
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
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Following the same framework, we next identify how the features of Spotify and Netflix’s 
business models specifically respond to the main value propositions of digital piracy. Table 3 
summarizes our findings. 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
The main attraction of digital piracy lies in providing access to content without the need to 
incur monetary outlays. There are other costs involved in digital piracy for consumers (e.g., 
electricity bills, expanded storage, bandwidth usage, possible piracy penalties, delayed 
consumption etc.), but access to content is nonetheless perceived to be ‘free.’ This separates the 
experience afforded by digital piracy from traditional content pricing models (including those of 
early digital stores such as Apple iTunes) where each unit of content is accompanied by a price 
tag. Spotify and Netflix’s subscription model provides a monetization avenue that responds to 
this challenge by matching a key perceived benefit of digital piracy: an ‘all-you-can-eat’ menu of 
music and movies.47 
“All-you-can-eat content model. By providing access to a large variety of titles, 
like Netflix with streaming movies, or Hulu for TV shows, with new content added 
regularly, there is always a reason to keep up your subscription. If you already have 
many followers for some limited free offerings, this also becomes a natural freemium 
upgrade.” (Marty Zwilling – Huffington Post, 2015)48 
The subscription model also simplifies the pricing proposition and payment processing for 
the firm. But this has the downside of limiting the extent of price discrimination that can be 
implemented. With traditional content pricing, each unit of content is independently priced and 
different versions of the same content can be offered at different price points (the deluxe version 
of a new music album or more popular movies can be priced at a price premium, for example). 
While the design of different subscription plans can enable some degree of price discrimination, 
as offered by Netflix based both on streaming quality and number of streams, effective 
monetization strategies against digital piracy often need to sacrifice the flexibility afforded by 
traditional content pricing models. In turn, this holds potential for major business growth. 
“If we’re able to transition the traditional radio behavior online, you’re looking at a 
music industry that’s much larger than it’s ever been. (…) If you do that, and also add 
subscription to the mix, especially at Spotify’s conversion rate, you’d be looking at a 
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music industry that would be $100bn to $160bn in size.” (Daniel Ek, CEO and founder at 
Spotify – Daily Mail, 2015).49 
Spotify’s free tier further erodes the comparative attractiveness of digital piracy. Clearly, this 
free tier is inviting to consumers on the pricing dimension, but also needs to accommodate the 
preferences of advertisers. Because advertisers are paying, the free tier operates as a two-sided 
platform serving both users and advertisers. Thus, Spotify needs to respond to the preferences of 
both parties when resolving tradeoffs where there are conflicts of interest, such as the frequency 
and intensity of advertising or the songs associated with each commercial. As anticipated, Spotify 
views the free tier as a feeder for future paid subscribers, as noted by CFO McCarthy when 
stating that “the ad-supported service is also a subsidy program that offsets the cost of new-user 
acquisition.”50 
The consumer experience also differs significantly when comparing digital piracy to 
commercial streaming services, particularly in the process of navigating and searching through 
the content catalog. Digital piracy is characterized by a complex and evolving constellation of 
communities and software that require skills and dedication on behalf of participants, resulting in 
a lower degree of convenience to the average user. Spotify and Netflix provide visual and 
intuitive interfaces that are much simpler to operate and stream content on-demand, immediately. 
The diffusion of smart TVs and other devices with built-in support for commercial streaming 
services further facilitates adoption and offers immediate gratification to consumer segments who 
are not familiar with the use of computers or tablets.  
“Whereas an Internet service like YouTube or Netflix runs on all your devices. It runs on 
a big screen but it also runs on the small screen too. It has got an Internet sensibility in 
terms of application updates, and integration with other services, and you know, all the 
things that come along with it.” (Reed Hastings, CEO and founder at Netflix – Financial 
Post, 2016)51 
The lack of DRM restrictions on pirated content offers several benefits.  Content can be 
consumed on any compatible device without the need for Internet access. Early commercial 
initiatives in the digital space were burdened with DRM schemes that restricted consumption 
choices for consumers, for instance by limiting playback to a small set of trusted devices or 
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requiring an Internet connection at all times. Spotify and Netflix implement DRM in a fashion 
that is consumer-friendly; content can be accessed from a wide range of devices and download 
functionality for offline consumption is available (with some limitations). While the erosion of 
DRM restrictions can facilitate unauthorized consumption or even piracy, streaming service 
customers are the clear winners. 
Digital piracy offers an extensive catalog in most content categories. Consumers can often 
find new releases and classics, as well as many back-catalog titles. Spotify offers a 
comprehensive music catalog that compares favorably against the catalog most consumers could 
access through piracy. This ensures the average consumer can access most of the music they are 
familiar with and discover new music they like on the service. Netflix’s catalog does not fare as 
well as that of Spotify in this regard. While high profile titles are available and prominently 
featured it is not uncommon for the average consumer to discover that desired titles are missing, 
more so in countries where the local catalog is small. The fundamental challenge for Spotify and 
Netflix in this area is to sustain and expand licensing agreements with content owners, 
particularly the major record labels and film studios, concerning the titles offered and the 
conditions under which consumers can access them. 
The desire for small file sizes in digital piracy can often lead to lower content quality or even 
corrupted files. While some piracy communities do focus on maintaining high quality standards 
for their files, finding acceptable copies can be the exception rather than the norm for the average 
user of digital piracy. Spotify and Netflix provide consumers with consistent streaming quality, 
and their advantage stands to further increase as Internet infrastructure improves. The quality 
provided by both services varies across subscription plans, and even though the highest available 
streaming qualities are technically inferior to those available on the best physical formats (CD 
audio or Blu-Ray video), quality consistency ensures customers an enjoyable experience. 
Social interactions play a key role in today’s media consumption. Consumers enjoy sharing 
their content consumption experiences, learning from those of others, and engaging in community 
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discussions. But the opportunity to do so in the context of digital piracy is limited by anonymity, 
heavy user churn, and limited community involvement. This provides an opportunity for 
commercial services to outperform piracy. Spotify and Netflix provide social media integration 
that facilitates social interactions and shared consumption. This value chain linkage strengthens 
the players (e.g., Facebook, Twitter) hosting the social interactions generated by content 
consumption, but also increases the size of the conversation by ensuring that non-subscribers can 
participate and perhaps become subscribers in the future. Spotify and Netflix also host some user 
generated content (e.g., ratings, reviews, playlists) on their services, though this is generally 
related to content scoring and mainly exploited for content discovery purposes. 
“In order for a service to be social, you’ve really got to start from the ground up. The fact 
that almost a third of the U.S. population have even heard of Spotify is really because 
they've seen it on Facebook and friends have been sharing.” (Daniel Ek, CEO and 
founder of Spotify – USA Today, 2012).52 
Content discovery also plays an important role in media consumption. With extensive digital 
catalogs providing an overwhelming abundance of options, it becomes key to help consumers 
discover new content in order to keep them engaged with the service. Digital piracy offers only 
primitive and non-customized tools for discovery, if any, as data collection and user profiling is a 
taboo for piracy users. Both Spotify and Netflix have seized this opportunity by implementing 
recommender systems and have invested substantial resources in the development of their 
proprietary algorithms. These systems exploit consumer service usage and ratings data to 
generate personalized content recommendations, and can also exploit the consumption patterns of 
connected users (e.g., ‘friends’ in social networking spaces) to foster shared experiences. 
Consumer feedback from both services suggest that these content recommendations are a 
valuable aspect of the service. 
Finally, release windows and geographical restrictions that limit commercial availability of 
content have long been a major driver of piracy. This includes the delayed release of movies or 
television series in different regions, or geographical restrictions on purchasing from online stores 
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such as Apple iTunes. This generates a dark zone in regions where the content is not 
commercially available. 
“Why would consumers wait that long for something they can have for free as soon as an 
illegal copy of the film is leaked? Our system is not working anymore and we have to 
listen to the consumer need in order to adapt it and reduce piracy […] The dark zone of a 
movie supply chain needs to completely disappear.” (Trevor Albery. Vice President 
Strategy & Operations, EMEA Content Protection & Analytics at Warner Bros. – Source: 
interview). 
In their agreements with content owners, both Spotify and Netflix have secured much improved 
geographical access for consumers compared to early digital distribution initiatives. This ensures 
that many consumers now have a viable alternative to digital piracy for the first time. 
Nonetheless, as noted in the preceding section, the gap between the music and film categories is 
still significant in this regard. 
COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE AGAINST PIRACY VIA BUSINESS MODELS 
  
In this section we present a causal loop diagram of the value creation and capture logic in our 
analysis above. Our goal is to illustrate how the strategic responses of Spotify and Netflix are 
internally consistent and how they feed the value generated (and captured) on these services over 
time. Figure 1 provides the representation. 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
The representation follows the methodology proposed by Casadesus-Masanell and Ricart 
(2010; 2011) which is a useful tool to highlight key implications for both theory and practice.53 
Underlined elements are choices made by the firm, and non-underlined elements are 
consequences. Arrows connect causes with consequences to identify positive feedback loops, and 
dashed arrows identify negative feedback loops. Elements inside a box are rigid consequences or 
stocks, which accumulate over time and change slowly in response to the feedback loops that 
cause them. 
Departing from the digital distributor’s revenues at the bottom of the diagram, a strategic 
choice by the firm is to offer a free tier with basic access to the service, either subject to 
advertising (Spotify’s free tier) or for a limited time period (Netflix’s free trial). The free tier 
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attracts new users to the service by matching a key perceived feature of digital piracy, namely 
free access to content, and therefore contributes to feed the userbase (i.e., the accumulated stock 
of users) over time. Sustaining the free tier is costly for the firm as it represents an investment to 
obtain future paid subscribers, so the choice is supported by the firm’s revenues generated 
elsewhere, as well as advertisers when present. Moreover, the free tier can also deter from user 
willingness to pay for the service (“user WTP”), as some users may find that it satisfies their 
immediate needs and choose to remain on the free tier (or initiate additional free trials in the 
future) rather than become paid subscribers. The firm needs to address this tension by setting the 
subscription price accordingly and managing the perks and functionalities reserved to paid 
subscribers (e.g., higher quality streams, more simultaneous streams, offline consumption, etc.) 
Content licensing agreements are essential to the firm’s service. Content owners (record 
labels, movie studios) typically command a large share of the revenues generated in distribution, 
which is their main source of profits. The distributor’s bargaining power vis-a-vis content owners 
increases with the userbase of the service. Given that most consumers within any content 
category subscribe to a single service, a dominant distributor becomes a gatekeeper for content 
owners seeking to monetize their content. Licensing agreements feed the content catalog 
available on the service, both in terms of the number of titles available as well as the conditions 
under which consumers can access them. 
Next up, on the top part of the diagram, there are three strategic choices the firm makes to 
compete with digital piracy. First, the firm exploits the userbase by implementing community 
features such as ratings, reviews, playlists, and social media integration. These interactions and 
shared experiences stand to increase the enjoyment users derive from the content. The value 
generated by these features increases with the size of the userbase, as this facilitates interactions 
between like-minded users and grows the potential audience for content curators and playlist 
producers. These features are unmatched by digital piracy, where anonymity and user churn are 
stumbling blocks for the community. 
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Second, the firm develops personalization tools such as recommender systems that aid users 
in discovering content that matches their taste when navigating the catalog. These tools are based 
on collaborative filtering algorithms that exploit datasets of user preferences and content 
characteristics to select what to recommend to each user. The quality of the personalization 
offered by the firm therefore increases with the userbase and the variety present in the content 
catalog; services with more user activity and larger catalogs can produce better recommendations. 
Such personalization is also unmatched by digital piracy, given the proprietary nature of the 
algorithmic improvements developed by commercial services and consumers’ reluctance to 
record consumption activity on pirate services. 
Third, the firm devotes resources to improve the quality of the service. This includes reliable 
streaming, consistent content quality, responsive interfaces, and compatibility across devices. 
Maintaining quality of service with userbase growth requires sustained infrastructure and 
software investment by the firm. Both Spotify and Netflix delivered substantial improvements in 
these areas compared to earlier services, and in content categories such as videogaming the 
technical challenges for reliable streaming are yet to be successfully deployed in the mass market. 
The firm’s strategic choices outlined above generate value for users and increase their 
willingness to pay (“User WTP” at the top of the diagram). This value is captured by the firm 
through the subscription tier, which commands a price for full access to the service and is the 
main source of revenue (most of Netflix revenues and close to 90% those of Spotify).  
It is important to note that some of the feedback loops present in the business model are in 
fact virtuous cycles. Given that the firm stands to accumulate a larger userbase and a larger 
content catalog over time, the potential to generate value also increases. This reinforces the firm’s 
choices to feed the userbase and the catalog, and to exploit them through personalization and 
community features. This enables the firm to capture more value, by sustaining higher 
subscription prices and reducing royalty payments to content owners, and eventually become the 
‘go to’ place for content consumption and discovery within its category. The value potential of 
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scaling up the service was recently summarized as follows by Barry McCarthy, CFO at Spotify 
and previously at Netflix: 
“The point here is that scale can be a great enabler of margin expansion, particularly if 
you couple it with greater data insights to drive a better user interface, add a better 
content experience, and in the process come to ‘own’ demand creation and the margin 
that comes with ‘owning’ demand creation.” (Barry McCharty,  CFO at Spotify – 
MusicBusinessWorldwide.com 2013) 54 
In the same intervention, McCarthy noted that Spotify was prioritizing growth over profitability 
but expected to eventually have gross margins of 30 to 35%. This is consistent with the business 
model logic described above, as well as investor expectations that Spotify and Netflix hold 
potential to become profitable businesses in the long term. 
This business model logic generates a competitive advantage against digital piracy, not by 
competing purely on price or in terms of available content, but by enriching the experience of 
navigating, discovering, consuming, and interacting with others. This competitive advantage can 
be considered in terms of market segmentation. There is a segment of consumers who value 
convenience and simplicity above other factors and will readily pay for subscription services. 
Similarly, there is a segment of consumers who are long term users of digital piracy, familiar with 
the benefits and limitations it affords and who will resist the switch to paid subscriptions. In the 
middle ground, there are consumers who may be familiar with digital piracy but willing to 
explore alternatives and perhaps subscribe to services that offer enough added value. It is this 
middle ground of the market that subscription services stand to conquer over time. 
The reader may have noticed that a factor missing in our representation above is the role of 
exclusive content, such as Netflix exclusive series that are not available on competing services 
(e.g., “House of Cards” or “Narcos”). There are two reasons for this. First, exclusive content is 
still a small share of the content pool, though it is heavily promoted by services as a 
differentiator. Third party content is critical to the success of any mass market service and will 
continue to play a major role in the foreseeable future. And second, while exclusive content 
certainly plays an important role in competition among commercial services, this is not the case 
when competing against digital piracy because exclusive titles are available to piracy users on the 
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same terms as non-exclusive titles. If anything, exclusive titles can lower the attractiveness of 
commercial offerings as a whole; if consumers find that several separate subscriptions are 
required to access the content they wish to consume, digital piracy becomes more attractive as a 
one-stop-shop. 55 While the market forces driving supply of exclusive content on these services 
are unlikely to change anytime soon, this type of content has limited effect against digital piracy. 
DISCUSSION 
We have analyzed how two iconic companies, Spotify and Netflix, effectively responded to 
the challenges of digital piracy by deploying innovative business models through their online 
platforms.  
“Since the launch of streaming solutions such as Netflix and Spotify, they have become 
alternatives to piracy. Sweden had many problems with music piracy and the arrival of 
Spotify reversed this curve.” (Debora Bona, Media Executive at Google Brazil – Torrent 
Freak, 2017)56 
More generally, by using a common theory-driven conceptualization of business models 
across four elements,57 we carefully identified how the different constituents of their business 
models (i.e., customer identification, customer engagement, monetization, and value chain 
linkages) were engineered to compete against piracy’s multifaceted value proposition. From our 
research endeavor, multiple noteworthy insights emerged, which we believe might inform and 
inspire both scholars and practitioners in further exploring the complex nuances of this 
phenomenon. 
We posit that such strategic responses can and should be considered in a multi-level 
fashion.58 In the following paragraphs, we explore some of the main implications for domains at 
the intersection with business models and digital piracy across three level or analysis: (1) 
technological innovation, (2) firm’s diversification, and (3) network competition.59 
Implications for technological innovation 
As we reflect on the complex interplay between ‘legit’ businesses and digital piracy, one 
contribution stands-out from our study, which aims to answer to one of the key questions in our 
research domain: “How do technology and business models interact?” Scholars voice that “we 
  23 
need a more precise appreciation of how innovation links to performance through the business 
model, and how changes in the business model influence technological innovation.”60 It is 
noteworthy that competition between firms has been traditionally conceived as a race for the 
acquisition and protection of unique and valuable resources and capabilities;61 among those, 
technology (particularly in the digital domain) more often than not has represented a key driver for 
firm competitive advantage.62 Evidence suggests that mass diffusion of technological innovations 
in the digital era has enabled piracy organizations to flourish, expand the proselytism among users, 
and become a significant and perhaps unavoidable threat to all those firms whose content can be 
digitized, copied, and easily transferred (often thanks to peer-to-peer sharing technologies).63 And 
yet, evidence suggests that digital technology here represents both ‘the poison and the antidote’, 
as, if properly leveraged, it can offer firms the basis for a better engagement with their customers, 
and a proficient response to piracy-driven innovation.  
“It’s not Netflix that’s making the changes. It’s the Internet. We’re figuring out every 
year how to use the Internet to make a great consumer experience. Every year is an 
experiment.” (Reed Hastings, CEO and founder at Netflix – 2016)64 
Our analysis elaborates this intuition in a structured way, by connecting how different 
technological solutions feed both the piracy value proposition and possible firm’s business model 
responses. 
Isolating and understanding these technological factors is timely and relevant for both theory 
and practice. Scholars could use the aforementioned elements to granularly explore (perhaps in a 
more quantitative fashion) causes and effects of innovation within business models, within and 
beyond the gamut of responses to digital piracy. Research warns that not all types of innovation 
hold the same benefit for business model performance, and its impact is contingent and 
complementary to the type of content, the industry, and other traditional competitive strategies 
including pricing schemes, and ecosystems. For example, we know that, despite its exponential 
growth, Spotify has yet to report positive profits,65 while Netflix only recently reported positive 
profits after a long period of growth.66 Beside academic research, practitioners could use our 
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systematization to assess their firms’ digital offerings and reflect on how diverse choices might 
offer barriers or disincentives to piracy alternatives.  
Implications for firm diversification 
Spotify and Netflix business models present evident similarities to other firms—such as Apple 
Music, Amazon Prime, Pandora, Hulu, or HBO, among others. All these organizations distribute 
digital content and engage with their audiences through online platforms. Such similarities 
represent the underlying basis to claim that, with all due limitations, a generalization of our 
implications to other businesses is possible, particularly in the digital domain (e.g., software and 
gaming platforms, etc.). Yet, we also recommend caution when applying our model to firms whose 
offering might be highly diversified. Research suggests diversification can at least encompass four 
aspects: products, geographical areas, vertical integration, and business models.67 Most firms adopt 
diversification strategies, and in such cases the implication for firm performance might be strongly 
influenced by the complementarities across multiple aspects—consider for example the impact of 
the overall Amazon or Apple product and services ecosystem on their businesses for music and 
videos (i.e., Apple Store and Apple Music; Amazon Music and Amazon Prime Video, 
respectively). And in the case of Netflix, initial success can also be explained by considering its 
pivoting between dual business models (i.e., DVD-by-mail first and online streaming later).68 There 
is evidence that this was Netflix executives’ original strategy. 
“Movies over the Internet are coming, and at some point it will become big business. (…) 
We started investing 1 percent to 2 percent of revenue every year in downloading, and I 
think it’s tremendously exciting because it will fundamentally lower our mailing costs. We 
want to be ready when video-on-demand happens. That’s why the company is called 
Netflix, not DVD-by-Mail.” (Reed Hastings, CEO and founder at Netflix – 2005)69 
But as commercial online ecosystems as well as digital piracy continue to evolve, businesses 
are finding additional opportunities within different dimensions of diversification, particularly in 
the offline domain. For example, given the revenue drop from music albums and movies sales, 
entertainment companies have started to more strongly engage with offline experiences, where 
digital plays a minor role (if any), such as spectacular music concerts whose futuristic stages and 
settings offer ‘a show within the show’ to the audience.70 Further, movie majors have also 
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commercialized experiences that showcase film settings and equipment (such as the Harry Potter 
Museum or HBO’s Game of Throne exhibition), or offer viewers a direct interaction with movie 
stars (e.g., with actors and directors roundtables at ComicCon and similar events). We purposefully 
decided to focus on companies whose business model is relatively simple and where 
product/industry diversification is limited, insofar we can possibly reduce concerns for intervening 
effects outside the scope of our study. We acknowledge this represents a limitation, and future 
research could address more complex cases by exploring such portfolio effects.71 Further, 
practitioners should adopt frameworks for business model diversification to fully appreciate and 
assess the full gamut of firm responses to digital piracy.72 
Implications for network competition 
Our study offers an appreciation of network effects and related implications for new business 
models with network-to-network competition. Digital piracy has grown as a community-based 
activity, where social interactions represent not only an incentive but also a source of guidance for 
users.73 In order to spread the piracy practice, chat-rooms, forums, private communities, and 
ultimately peer-to-peer sharing are in fact some of the most common and successful solutions, 
which businesses are constantly trying to offset and eradicate.  
Digital business models, however, display features that can advance a viable counter-offer. In 
fact, they share similarities to piracy platforms: they too are often designed as multi-sided platforms 
that connect multiple users of the same group (through recommendations and reviews, in-app chats, 
social networking etc.) and different groups (e.g., by linking content producers with users; 
advertisers with potential buyers etc.). Hence, in these domains customer complementarities and 
network opportunities do not merely represent a peripheral feature, but are progressively elevated 
to become major drivers for user adoption—for example research and practice claims that review 
systems have played a major role in the success of companies such as Amazon, Netflix, EBay, 
AirBnB, and TripAdvisor.74  
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If network effects become one of the main sources of competitive advantage, it is plausible 
that competition in such industries might be ruled by ‘winner takes all’ dynamics between 
alternative offers.75 Simply put, if product and costs are perceived as undifferentiated across 
competitors, users might decide to engage with one company rather than another because of the 
social network and ecosystem complementors they offer.76 As an example, users might decide to 
use a specific music platform where they can find and enjoy their peers’ playlists and related 
recommendations, as well as useful complementary apps (see for example DJ mixing apps like 
Algoiddim or Pacemaker sourcing music from Spotify). Executives from the industry echo this 
reflection and underline how: 
“…Enhancing the customer experience is the key element to rival with piracy.”  
(Executive at Warner Bros. France – Authors’ Interviews, 2017) 
Another interesting reflection related to network effects comes from comparing responses to 
piracy, deployed by traditional incumbents vs. digital newcomers. Evidence and quotes from the 
industry revealed that incumbents’ responses to piracy have long been confined to mostly off-line 
actions aimed to improve value chain processes within their traditional (often dyadic) business 
models—for example by reducing the users’ waiting time between theatre release and CD/DVD 
release. Despite valuable, it is evident that most of these responses cannot fully offset the networked 
value propositions offered by digital piracy. This in part explains why newcomers such as Spotify, 
Netflix, and others (whose digital offers did respond to such needs) emerged as the fastest growing 
companies in their respective markets, leapfrogging incumbents such as Blockbuster and 
distribution initiatives by music and movie majors, which nonetheless were favored by their 
dominant positions, superior resources, and direct access to market.77 Digital engagement helped 
rather small players to spread their pervasiveness and reach competitive scale in a relatively short 
time. 
“For Netflix, the idea was to be ‘there’ and to be everywhere, just like piracy 
is.” (Executive at Warner Bros. France – Authors’ Interviews, 2017) 
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CONCLUSION 
Digital piracy represents a timely and complex challenge for many organizations. Our work 
aims to clarify how leveraging business models in the digital space can ‘change the game’, by 
offering a new consumption paradigm and an effective response to digital piracy. Our analysis 
started by identifying three main aspects of digital piracy: the creation of a first digital copy, 
general access to digital copies, and consumption of digital copies. Our analysis of business 
model responses suggests that digital distribution can outperform piracy mainly by improving 
upon the latter of the three, the consumption experience. This implies a strong focus on 
accessibility and convenience, better navigation and guidance, and facilitating social interactions 
and the opportunity for shared experiences absent in digital piracy.  
Our analysis builds on our case studies of Spotify and Netflix. Yet, we expect our findings to 
extend beyond music and film to other content categories such as written and interactive works. 
Early commercial initiatives such as Amazon’s Kindle Unlimited for books or Sony’s PlayStation 
Now for videogames share common characteristics to our cases. This includes licensing 
agreements with third-party content owners, free tiers (trial periods), and incipient personalization 
and community features (personalized recommendations and sharing of notes and highlights on 
Amazon’s Kindle, for instance). Further, one can expect consumer expectations and technological 
advances to drive convergence across content categories over time. 
Still, we acknowledge our setting presents clear idiosyncrasies which need to be taken into 
account. More work is needed to fully understand this phenomenon across other industries, and 
boundary conditions in each industry need to be carefully assessed to avoid acritical 
generalizations of our findings.  
We hope that our work will contribute to spur further research and understanding in this area 
as well as encourage business model innovation and performance optimization within established 
organizations. In particular, we hope our contribution is helpful to those working in the several 
industries where content protection and monetization remains a paramount priority for financial 
sustainability. The cases we explored identify viable templates for business model responses in 
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major industries, but also suggest that existing incumbents are far from saturating the scope for 
business model innovation.  
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TABLE 1. Characteristics of different media categories and digital piracy 
Content 
category Container Costs to produce the first digital copy Accessing digital copies Using digital copies 
Audio 
(Music albums, 
live 
recordings...) 
Physical: long play 
records, compact 
cassettes, CDs 
- Dedicated hardware (cassette player, CD 
drive). 
- Basic skills and software required. 
- Re-encoding of content for distribution. 
- Collective consumption 
facilitates sharing of copies. 
- Excellent digital availability of 
back-catalog. 
- Medium storage and bandwidth 
requirements for digital copies. 
- Broad software support. 
- Low hardware playback 
requirements. Digital: audio files 
(MP3, FLAC), 
streaming1 
- General computing device. 
- DRM and watermarking removal. 
Film 
(Movies, TV 
shows, 
documentaries...) 
Physical: video 
cassettes, DVDs, 
Blu-ray 
- Dedicated hardware (VHS player and capture 
system, DVD/Blu-ray drive). 
- Basic skills and software required. 
- Re-encoding of content for distribution. 
- Collective consumption 
facilitates sharing of copies. 
- Good digital availability of 
back-catalog. 
- High storage and bandwidth 
requirements for digital copies. 
- Broad software support. 
- Average hardware playback 
requirements. Digital: video files 
(AVI, MKV), 
streaming2 
- General computing device. 
- DRM and watermarking removal. 
Written works 
(Books, 
magazines, 
comics...) 
Physical: print 
- Dedicated hardware (scanner). 
- OCR and formatting. 
- Medium skills and substantial workload 
- Individual consumption does not 
facilitate sharing. 
- Limited digital availability of 
back-catalog. 
- Low storage and bandwidth 
requirements for digital copies. 
- Average software support. 
- Inferior copies can worsen. 
experience (format conversions, 
lack of OCR/navigation). 
- Specialized hardware (e-reader 
or tablet) required for comfortable 
consumption. 
Digital: eBooks 
(EPUB, MOBI)3, 
documents (PDF)4 
- General computing device. 
- DRM and watermarking removal. 
- Format conversion for distribution. 
Interactive works 
(Videogames, 
software 
applications...) 
Physical: 
cartridges, 
cassettes, floppy 
disks, Optical disks 
- Dedicated hardware (modified consoles, 
advanced CD/DVD burner). 
- Advanced skills and dedicated software 
required. 
- Individual consumption 
(generally) does not facilitate 
sharing. 
- Full digital availability of back-
- Usage of digital copies requires 
specific skills (applying cracks, 
malware risks). 
- Digital copies have limited 
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Digital: downloads 
- General computing device. 
- Complex DRM removal. 
- Re-packaging of content for distribution. 
- Updates require incremental DRM removal 
efforts. 
catalog. 
- Updates require access to new 
copies. 
- Storage and bandwidth 
requirements for digital copies 
varies. 
online functionality or may lack 
updates. 
- Specialized hardware (modified 
console) may be required for 
consumption. 
Legend: Technical terms used in Table 1 
 
1. “MP3 (formally MPEG-1 Audio Layer III or MPEG-2 Audio Layer III) is an audio coding format for digital audio. MP3 (or mp3) as a 
file format commonly designates files containing an elementary stream of MPEG-1 audio and video encoded data, without other 
complexities of the MP3 standard.” “FLAC (Free Lossless Audio Codec) is an audio coding format for lossless compression of digital 
audio, and is also the name of the free software project producing the FLAC tools, the reference software package that includes a codec 
implementation.” (Source: Wikipedia.org). 
2. “Audio Video Interleaved (also Audio Video Interleave), known by its initials AVI, is a multimedia container format introduced by 
Microsoft in November 1992 as part of its Video for Windows software. AVI files can contain both audio and video data in a file 
container that allows synchronous audio-with-video playback.” “The MKV (Matroska Multimedia Container) is an open standard, free 
container format, a file format that can hold an unlimited number of video, audio, picture, or subtitle tracks in one file. It is intended to 
serve as a universal format for storing common multimedia content, like movies or TV shows. Matroska is similar in concept to other 
containers like AVI, MP4, or Advanced Systems Format (ASF), but is entirely open in specification, with implementations consisting 
mostly of open source software.” Source: Wikipedia.org 
3. “EPUB is an e-book file format with the extension .epub that can be downloaded and read on devices like smartphones, tablets, 
computers, or e-readers.” “Mobipocket SA is a French company incorporated in March 2000 that created the .mobi e-book file format 
and produces the Mobipocket Reader software for mobile phones, personal digital assistants (PDA) and desktop operating systems. The 
Mobipocket software package is free and consists of various publishing and reading tools for PDAs, smartphones, mobile phones, the e-
readers Kindle and iLiad, and applications on devices using Symbian, Windows, Palm OS, Java ME and Psion.” (Source: 
Wikipedia.org). 
4. “The Portable Document Format (PDF) is a file format used to present documents in a manner independent of application software, 
hardware, and operating systems. Each PDF file encapsulates a complete description of a fixed-layout flat document, including the text, 
fonts, graphics, and other information needed to display it.” (Source: Wikipedia.org).
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TABLE 2. Comparison of Spotify and Netflix business models 
Business 
Model 
Elements 
Features Spotify Netflix 
Customer 
identification 
Customer 
groups 
Freemium (Free with Ads) + 
Subscription: 
- Free tier: two-sided business 
model with advertisers and 
users who enjoy free basic 
service with ads. 
- Subscription tier: single 
sided business model, 
consumers pay and enjoy 
access to premium 
functionality. 
 
Spotify's goal is to convert 
free users to pay subscribers. 
Subscription only: 
- Subscription tier: single sided 
business model, consumers pay 
for full access to the service. 
- Free 30-day trial available. 
- Subscription DVD-by-mail 
(USA only): single sided 
business model, consumers pay 
for rental DVDs via post 
shipping. 
 
Netflix's goal is to reduce and 
possibly terminate the DVD-
by-mail model. 
Customer 
engagement 
Geographical 
coverage 
- Spotify subscriptions are 
available in 60 countries. 
- Subscribers can stream 
content while traveling 
without restrictions. 
- Netflix subscriptions are 
available in over 190 countries. 
- Subscribers can stream 
content while traveling, but are 
restricted to the catalog of the 
destination country. 
Content 
navigation 
- Intuitive and visual 
interface. 
- Users can create their 
personal library and playlists. 
- Recommender system 
generates personalized 
content recommendations 
based on usage of service. 
- Intuitive and visual interface. 
- Users can create playlists. 
- Recommender system 
generates personalized content 
recommendations based on 
usage of service. 
Catalog size 
- Comprehensive. Over 30 
million songs from artists 
worldwide. 
- Music supplied by record 
labels and/or distributors. 
Aggregators collect royalties 
for independent artists. 
- Limited and varies per 
country. US catalog is largest 
with 4593 movies and 1157 
series. Most countries have a 
smaller catalog due to content 
agreements and/or localization 
limitations (e.g., average 
catalog size in European 
countries is 1/3 of US catalog) 
(2) 
- Movies and series generally 
supplied by providers, 
distributors, producers and 
creators. 
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Exclusive 
content 
- No exclusive music, but 
promotes independent artists 
and selected playlists. Some 
exclusive registrations of live 
concerts. 
- Produces original content for 
exclusive distribution. Also co-
produces or licenses content 
for exclusive distribution in 
some countries. 
Monetization Pricing 
- Free tier. Ad-sponsored, 
basic audio streaming quality, 
no offline listening. 
- Subscription tier. No ads, 
higher audio streaming 
quality, offline listening. 
Individual and family plans 
(up to 6 accounts) available. 
- Subscription only. Basic, 
standard and premium plans 
which differ in video streaming 
quality (standard definition, 
high definition, ultra-high 
definition) and number of 
simultaneous streams for 
family usage (one, two, or four 
streams). (1) 
Value chain 
linkages 
Content 
consumption 
-The streaming service can be 
accessed from PCs and 
laptops, smartphones and 
tablets, game consoles, and 
specialized devices (smart 
TVs, media streamers, sound 
systems, wearables). 
- Subscribers can download 
content on their devices for 
offline consumption. 
- The streaming service can be 
accessed from PCs and laptops, 
smartphones and tablets, game 
consoles, and specialized 
devices (smart TVs, Blu-ray 
players, media streamers, set-
top boxes) 
- Subscribers can download 
selected content on their 
devices for offline 
consumption. 
Streaming 
quality 
- Lossy audio encoding in the 
bitrate range 96-320 kbps. 
High bitrates (available only 
on subscription tier) are 
transparent to most users 
when compared to CD 
quality. 
-Lossy video and audio 
encoding with resolutions in 
the 480p-2160p range. Quality 
perceived to be close to 
DVD/Blu-ray by most users. 
Networked 
effects 
- User ratings and popularity 
feedback through play counts 
and thumbs-up rates. 
- Playlists and channels by 
content curators. 
- Integration with social 
media services (e.g. 
Facebook, Twitter) to share 
what you are listening to, 
links to content/playlists. 
- User ratings and reviews. 
- Integration with social media 
services (e.g. Facebook, 
Twitter) to share what you are 
watching, links to content. 
 
  
  
  33 
TABLE 3. Business model responses to digital piracy, limitations and challenges 
Business model 
elements Digital piracy 
Firm responses 
(Spotify, Netflix) 
Limitations and 
challenges 
Customer 
identification 
Subsidized by ads: 
advertisers pay for 
the costs. 
Free tier: freemium option 
with ads; or time-limited 
free trial. 
Advertising bias, 
subscriber 
conversion to 
paid tiers. 
Customer 
engagement. 
 
Access convenience: 
slow downloads, 
requires skills and 
dedication. 
Streaming: one-click 
playback, instantaneous 
gratification, simple and 
intuitive interface. 
Internet 
infrastructure 
and quality of 
service 
requirements. 
Consumption 
convenience: no 
DRM or device 
restrictions. 
Broad accessibility: 
comprehensive support 
across devices, offline 
consumption. 
Unauthorized 
consumption or 
sharing of 
content. 
Content variety: 
extensive catalog, 
high search costs. 
Rich catalog: 
comprehensive catalog, 
updated and well organized, 
effective navigation. 
Licensing 
agreements with 
content owners. 
Content quality: 
inconsistent, difficult 
to anticipate. 
Consistent quality: 
adequate to high quality, 
depending on subscription 
tier. 
Inability to 
upsell higher 
quality content. 
Monetization. Monetary outlays: low costs for users. 
Subscription model: 
simple tariff, pay once for 
access, low transaction 
costs. 
Limits price 
discrimination 
across segments. 
Value chain linkages 
. 
Community 
component: sharing 
ethos, limited user 
interactions. 
Networked response: 
social media integration, 
community features, 
personalized content 
recommendations. 
Value 
appropriated by 
social media 
providers. 
Commercial 
restrictions: 
bypasses release 
windows and 
geographical 
restrictions. 
Global reach: large 
geographical footprint, 
global simultaneous 
releases. 
Limited price 
discrimination 
across regions. 
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FIGURE 1. Causal loop representation of business model responses 
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